The two cases that are to be analyzed in the further document concern the Nord Stream project and involve two parties. The first one is the Nord Stream stakeholders, the representative negotiator of which is Dirk von Ameln. The party is interested in building the pipeline as soon as possible while sticking to their budget for the construction. Their enterprise is disturbed by the fishermen’s party, which can suffer economic disaster because of the project implementation. Yet, they are willing to negotiate and have chosen Bengt Petersen as their representative. The party wants to ensure that their business is secure and that Nord Stream will compensate for all possible losses in the appropriate amount of money (Burger & Röller, 2011). The challenges before the negotiators are, then, to defend their interests. The possible solution to the problem would be a constructive dialogue between both parties to integrate their interests.
Hence, some negotiation facts should be discussed before any conclusive strategies are suggested. First of all, the parties have different interests related to the project. The Nord Stream wants to minimize the expenses and speed up the construction process by paying compensation for repairs and loss of profit for the fishermen. The fishermen want to enlarge their profit by the payments since their industry is in decline; also, indeed, they want their business to be safe. The alternatives are €4000 for repairs and €33000 for loss in income for 17 years as the Nord Stream’s proposal and €6000 for repairs and €35000 for loss in revenue for 16 years as for the fishermen (Burger & Röller, 2011). The target point for the Nord Stream corresponds to their alternative plus a possible payment of €9000 to each fisherman for speeding up the process. Petersen hopes to increase compensations payment duration to 20 years or more for the fishermen. The reservation point for the Nord Stream is, as mentioned earlier in the alternatives, while for the fishermen, it is 16 years of compensation that is higher than the Nord Stream desires to pay and higher repair cost. Both parties have bargaining power in the person of the Danish minister, yet, fishermen have more influence in this situation. Thus, the zone of potential agreements between the parties might be €4000 for repairs and €33000 for 20 years while paying €4000 to hasten the process.
Next, it is important to discuss further alternatives for the parties. In fact, both representatives’ strategies are distributive since they are competitive and interested only in the profits for their organizations. If an integrative negotiation is applied, for example, by the authorities, both parties should communicate their interests and find common ground by establishing value in their opponents’ views. For example, an alternative for the Nord Stream would be to stop trying to hasten the construction and pay more attention to the factors that influence it. In turn, they can shorten the payments to the fishermen for this goal. On the opposite side, the fishermen can demand lesser repair compensation to fulfill both parties’ interests.
Finally, some strategies can be proposed for the negotiating parties. The best strategy for the fishermen would be compromising so that their position would not be just that of enlarging their profit. The Nord Stream should compromise as well, yet some benefits proposed earlier can be avoided. Yet, there might be difficulties with the fishermen who do not wish to compensate and blame the Nord Stream before the minister sabotage the project. To avoid this, the Nord Stream should choose a careful communication style to present their proposition to the fishermen as beneficial and be ready to make additional payments to them and the negotiations with the minister.
Burger, C., & Röller, L. (2011). Nord Stream and the Danish fishermen.